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IN THE SlJPREME COURT
OF THE s~r A 1~E OF UTAH

ST . \ TE OlP lTT AT-I~ by and through
it~ R(L~D t~O:\l~[lSSlO~~

Plain.tiff and Appell(wd;,
-

vs.-

J+ HO"\"\T ..~RD \T AL~J~""TTNE and
FJJORENCE R. \TAI$EXTINE,
Defendants,

Case
No. 9100

R.EFINING
l~ 0 \T P .\~'""Y, a Corporation"
I ntr..r-~ ~en·i·n. g De_f endamt
arui Respo·n.d CJlf.

\Yr~tST·ERN STATF~S

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
INTR.ODU(~TION

There are four tr anser1 p1.s of tc8t.imony in this case,
dating from .A. ugust 12, 1952, through Mareh 11, 1fi;)~J..
For the purpoE-;es of this hrief, \Ve shall refer to tla~ testimony adduced on tl1c~ motion for the order of occupaney
as rrr+ 0. 0., and to other testimon·y as Tr. Trans.~ dated
R-eference is made to tho rec.ord as R.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ T T _ _ _ .,

l
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Pursuant to a resolution of the Road Commission,
dated July 21, 1952 (Exhibit No. 1 ), the plaintiff7 State
of Utah, by and through its R-oad Commission, com~
meneed this antion on July 31, 1952, against the defendants, J. Hovtard Valentine, nov.t deceased, and Florence
S . Valentine, by the service of summons, the :filing of a
complaint and a notice of the hearing on the motion for
the occupanc.y of the property described in the complaint.
(R. 1-8}
On August 12, 1952, a hearing was held before the
Sec.ond District Court on the motion for immediate occu~
pancy, at which time an order was granted, subject to
conditions4 ( R4 50) On August 29, 1952, a formal order
,\~.as entered l1y the court, granting t.h c plain tiff the right
t.o immediately oc-cupy the premises, eonditioned t.hat
t.he defendants be permitted to retain possession of the
premises until said premises were actually needed by
the plaintiff. (R. 9) On December 6, 1955, the \Vestern

States Refining Company~ a corporation, :filed a motion
to intervene as a defendant in the cause. The e.ourt

granted the motion4 (lt 13) On November 7, 1956~ plain~
tiff moved for the dismissal of the claim of the inter\·enor.
'The motion was denied. (Tr4 Trans. Xov. 7, 1956, 4-8)
Pursuant to notice filed and served on the defendants
v·alentine on or about the 1st. day of November, 1955,
the plaintiff took possession of the premises as of about
the 12th day of December, 1955. Hearings on the matter
on its merits "\Vere held on ~ovember 7, 1956, February 4,
2
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19il9, and ~1 arch 11~ 1959. At the conclusion of whiell, the
trial court entered a judgment on findings of fact and
eonclusions of law in favor of the intervening defendants
in the sum of $17 ~500, together with interest.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about the 5th of February, 1959, judgment \Vas
entered and satisfied in favor of the defendants \!alentine. (R~ 30-32) Hence, the Valentines are no longer par~
ties to this action. The question now before this Court
is "\V hether the intervenor, Western States Refining
Company~ can recover damages by virtue of the pur~
ported lease ~Thieh \ve shall discuss more fully as we proceed in the argument of this case. The record indicates
that a lease \vas executed on April 10, 1952, between the
Valentines and the Western States Refining Company~
involving the property sought to be condemned by the
State Road Commission. (Exhibit A)
.A.t the commencement of this aetion, the intervenor
was not a party defendant. It '\VHS agreed and stipulated
between the parties that nothing was on record to indi~
cate any interest in the property other than that of the

'Talentines at the time the summons 'vas served in this

ac-tion.. crrL Trans. D.Iarch

11~

1959, page 33)

.:\t the hearing on the motion for thG oi"dcr of or('u-

pancy,

~1r.

Valentine was the vice-president of the Vl est~

ern States Refining Company, and Mr. Wagstaff was

tl1e ptf\~.;ident of the corporation~ both being present in

3
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eourt and both agreed to the order of the court, not only
by silence and acquiescence, but by constructive and
aet.i ve participation therein. (Tr. 0. 0. 20-21) During the
hearing on the order for occupancy, ~ir. "\\T agstaff V~-Tas
named as associate counsel. (Tr. 0. 0. 18)
1-\.t the date of the service of summons and the serv-

ice of notice of the motion f.or occupancy, the service station \Vas TlOt in operation. {Tr. 0. 0. 13-15) (Tr. Trans.,
X OVr 7, 1956, p,. 9-10)

STATEMENT OF POINrrs
POIN't

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED I~ PERMITTING THE
WESTERN STATES REFINING COMPANY'" TO INTER\IE~E IN THE CAUSE FOR THE REASON THAT SAID
CORPORATION ¥lAS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIIviiNG
DML\GES FOR THE UNEXPIRED TERM OF THE
PURPORTED LEASE WITH THE DEFENDANTS VALENTINE BY ACQUIESCING IN AND RECEIVING THE
BENEFITS FROM THE ORDER OF OCCUPANCY.
PoiNT

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED I~ DENYING PLA.IN ..
TIFF~s MOTION TO DISMISS THE PETITION TO IN·
TERVENE BY THE WESTERN STATES REFINING
COMPANY.
Poi~T

III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS IN
DET·ERMINING THAT THE INTERVENOR WAS ENTITLED TO AND HAD A RIGHT TO OPERATE A
SERVICE STATION UNTIL AUGUST 9~ 1962, OR AT
ALL, AND TO HAVE JUDGMENT ENTERED IN ITS
FAVOR FOR DAMAGES .
4
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IV.

PoiNT

THE PURPORTED LEASE WAS EXECUTORY
AND AS SUCH WAS NOT BINDING UPON THE PLAINTIFF WHO HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF SUCH LEASE.

v. . .

PoiNT

THERE ARE NO DAlviAGES RECOVERABLE BY
THE INTERVENOR, FOR THE REASON THAT AT THE
TIME OF ENTERING INTO THE ALLEGED LEASE
UPON WHICH THEY SUE~ THE INTERVENOR KNEW
THAT THE PROPERTY WAS ABOUT TO BE CONDEMNED AND THAT ANY INTEREST IT TOOK
WAS A DEFEASIBLE INTEREST SUBJECT TO
DEFEASANCE.
PorN-r VI.

AT THE DATE OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS,.
THE INTERVENOR HAD NO OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE AND COULD NOT EVALUATE THE LEASEHOLD .
.

PoiNT

VII.

THERE \VAS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT TO ASSESS DAMAGES TO
THE INTERVENOR.
ARG17MEXT
PoiNT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE
WESTERN STATES REFINING COMPANY TO INTEn~
VENE IN THE CAUSE FOR THE REASON THAT SAID
CORPORATION WAS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING
D1\MAGES FOR THE UNEXPIRED TERM OF THE
PURPORTED LEASE WITH THE DEFENDANTS VALE!\TINE BY ACQUIESCING IN AND RECEIVING THE
BENEFITS FROM THE ORDER OF OCCUPANCY.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Western States Refining Company was not a
party to the action until on or about December 6~ 1955.
Non etheles 8, the co rpo ration through its principal office rst
was in oourt and actively engaged in the arrangement
contained in the order of occupancy.. Query: Is the corporation bound by the agreements and stipulation of its
officers entered into at the date of the order of oc.cu~
pancy, August 12, 19527

As we understand the intervenor's contention before the trial court was that inasmuch as it ( t.he corpo~
ration) was not a party to the action, it could not be bound
by any action agreed upon by its vice~president and
acquiesced in by its president. rro this~ we disagree.
e
tbi11k that even though such acts were apparently not
authorized by the corporation, the same were ratified by
the acceptance of the benefits accruing therefrom and
that under the agreement,. they had no cause of action
after the need for the property by the plaintiff was
indicated.

' :r

''It is a 'veil established general rule that a corporation ,v}litll, '\vith knowledge of its officers' or
agent::t ~ unauthorized contract or act and of the
nta trrial fa r.t s eon~ern.ing it, rccc i i"r..:; and rc I ai·J1S
/h.(' bettP.fit.r; resulting therefrom ratifies the trans;l r.tlon if it is one ra pa ble of ra tifica tio11 by
parole. t J (Emphasis added)
13 j\m.

7 A.
~f r~

1-'~

J ur.,

CorporatioiH:~, DSJ~

It. 467 and 48·7.

v. .a Ieuti n e, as 'vell as ~1 r. \ Ya gst a ff, '': a s a -l:1 in g in

a dual ca pa(· i iy at the time of the he a ring on t ht~ motion

6
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for the order of ooou pancy. ~lr. Valentine was the vicepresident of the intervenor and as an individual had been
the O\VIH!f of the propt~rty sought to be condemned sinre
1947. (Tr~ 0~ 0. 10)
From the testimony of ~ir. Valentine (Tr.
\\-e find the following statements:

0~

0.

12)~

''TV e have grown from a small plant, of
course~ a~ refineries

go 1..ve are still a

vPr~-

small

plant."

"On r only recourse is to build ou,r O\vn station1-3. Jlr e 1• ave he en planning to build this station
on this place for the last three or four years~ We
have been saving our money to get proper financing and have \vaited until ·u:e could get our volume
up too and no'v ~ue have found that tte absolutely
have to have it in order to take care of thi8 iner~·a sed produetion o j' our plant. '' (Emphasis
added)

And at Tr. 0. 0. 13~ Ivlr4 Valentine further informs us:

"'"' Q. You are not eon testing the State ~s right to
take this

property~

1 told them they co nld have it if they
\Vould gi \'(' ~~-u· a strip Homev~~hcre else if 1
cou1d mov(~ tny equipmenL on it.
(Emphasis arlded)

"A.

Xo.

p

In ans"Ter to the eo u rt :t s question the defendant
Valentine t-:.tated ~

"\"\'e ean get hack tl•c hig f-)hare of thi.~ money
the next fev{ m(nlths on the gallonage 1ve sell there.
T1tr- monev has been spent, tbey are pumping ga~
t llc·rP tod'~~T· n { Enlphas[~ added}
.
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'.!

~fhis

substantial information indi eatcs thH t _jl1·. aleJJtine ~·Hs not only acting in his own capacity as the
lessor, but \Vas acting for and on behalf of the intervenor.
1111 e \"\-,..estern States Refining Company took possession
of t.he property immediately after the order of occupancy
and they continued in such capacity as lessee until December, 1955. During that time, the corporation reaped
t l l e benefits of th-e cond·itioned o rrler of occupancy and,
t.lH.~refore~ are estopped from making any elaim as to
datnages for the unexpired term of the lease4 (Tr~ 0. 0.
15-17, 20) The order was entered on this basis.
(Tr. 0. 0. 20)

It is generall)· understood that estoppel to question
or object to a thing done or any position taken by another

may arise by express consent thereto. This rule has
been applied in numerous instances to preclude the con~cnting par~.y

from asserting the invalidity or avoiding

the consequences of acts which were beyond the legiti-

mate and rightful powers of the parties acting \vhen done
pursuant thereto, or in

re1irua~c

on, sueh consent

ns the reduction of a verdict by a court which
fJO\ver to

·~

such

h~~

no

disturb such verdict. 19 Am~ J ur., Estoppel,.

para+ 61.

The doctrine of estoppel is frequently applied to

transactions in

\V

hich it would be uncon sci ona ble to per-

mit a person t.o maintain a

po~iti.on

incoltsistent with

8
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one in \\·hi(·}~ het or those by Vt hose acts he is bound, has
acquiese.ed. 19 Am. J ur., Estoppel, para. 62.
7

''Estoppel is frequent Iy based upon tile
aecep1 n ru~e and retention 11y one having kno ...vlcdge
(}[' notice of the facts or benefits from a transac.ti<~n, contract, instl'umcnt, regulation or statute
upon "\Vhich he might ha\·e rejected or contested."
''Such e~ to ppe1 operates to prevent a party
thus benefiting from questioning the validity and
effectiveness of 1l~c matter or transaction insofar
a~ it imposes a liability or restriction upon him; or
in other "rords, it precludes one vrho accepts the
benefits from repudiating the accompanying or
resulting obligations. ~ ~

19 Am. Jur., Estoppel, para. 64, p. 686-687 .
HGenerally speaking, a part~y \viii not be permitted to occupy inconsistent positions or to take
a position in regard t.o a matter "\vhich is directly
eontrary to> or inconsistent \\·ith one previou~ly
as;:.;umed hy him, at least. \vhere l1c llad or \\. as
r.hargeab1e \Yi t 1t full kTlO\vlr~dg-e of the fae1 ~ and
another \\·ill l llj prejud i PO< 1 hy hi~ act ionR. ~ ~
19 Am. J ur., Estoppel, para. 50r

The law '\vill not stand by in silence and see
one party mislead anotl1er to his injury, whether
by ignorance, nr.gligence or desig-n. ~ ~
d

Tracey v. fjtandard .A cc t~. I n.s. Co., 119 Me~ 131, 109
~·\.

490, 9 A. I_j, R-. 521.

In H a-rnrn.o·nd.'l ·c.

Fle'l~)ellen

(1932), rrex. Civ. .i\..pp.,

48 S.\V~ 2d 813, the court stated:

9
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"If a person either hy VlOrds or conduct has
intimated that he \viii otTer 110 opposition to an act
to he done or induces a reasonable belief that he
consents to tlu.~ act in vie'v to be done and another
person is thf~n~l,y induced to do that from which he
otherwise might have ahstainod~ such person
¥1-'"0uld be estopped from questioning the act done
or tho fair inference to be dra,vn from his
conduct.~'

PoiNT

Il.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE PETITION TO INTERVENE BY THE WESTERN STATES REFINING
COMPANY.

('rr.

1,ran~.,

November 7,

1956~ p .

4-8)

"\V e incorporate the argument contained under Point
I and hereby refer to it as our argument under Point II
of this brief.
PoiNT

III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS IN
DETERMINING THAT THE INTERVENOR WAS EN..
TITLED TO AND HAD A RIGHT TO OPERATE A
SERVICE STATION UNTIL AUGUST 9, 1962, OR AT
ALL!' AND TO HAVE JUDGMENT ENTERED IN ITS
FAVOR FOR DAMAGES .
·The intervenor is bound by th-e stipulations and
agreement made at tl1e hearing on the order of occupancy
nnd the court's order in respect thereto.. The service
station v.ras not built on the land in question and "-a~ not
iu operation at the time of the ~er\Tiee of gummonH. All

10
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affect on market value or value of lea.sehold interest has
arisen from the date of the summons and the use of the
property since that time. Section 78~34~11, Utah Code
A.nnotated 1953.

The intervenor is not in a position as an innoc.cn t
purchaser who had lost tl1e benefit of its bargain. All
value of the lease arose after the order of O('r..lJ pancy and
\Yas tl~e resn lt of that ordcr4 The intervenor }lad .net tu=tl
notice of the proc.e edings in this cause ; and if they so
desired, they cnuld have come in under Section 78-34-7,
Utah Code A nnotatcd 1953, immediately after the 81Jmmons was served in the action against the V alentincs.

THE PURPORTED LEASE WAS EXECUTORY
AND AS SUCH WAS NOT BINDING UPON THE PLAINTIFF WHO HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF SUCH LEASE.
On April 10, 1953, the defendants and th(~ intervenor entered into a lease agreemGnt (F~xhihit A), "\vhich
[.;Hid lease provided in part as follo,vs:

"Said lease to co-rn.Jncucc Oil· /.he 10th da.y of Augu8t, 1952, for a tcrtn of ten years .fron~ thence
n.e~tt ensuing fiUd to expi.re o·n l"h c 9th dny of . .A. ugust, 19G2 . ~ * *, the .first i u .~t all·nH!.n t to h er~otnr·
dnt on flu-~ 1oth of ~-1 ngust, 1.~J.52, (;r as 800·n therraft{'-r as a se-rt."ice sf a tion is erected an.rl ar:reptPtl
as h crei n a/ i cr pro rid r'd~''
{EmplHi~i~ addrrL)

The lease further provides in

f.luhstctnce

that the serv-

ice station 'vns to be coT~structed aeeording to plans and

11
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spl~t~-ifications

provided by the "intervenor and attaehed
as a part of the lease. It further provides that the lessee
may as~ign tlle lease to a corporation to be fo1·med which
shall be a \V holly O\vned subsidiary of the lessee, and that
the Hs~ignment shall be made without recourse to the
lessee. It. is interesting to note at this point that no plans
and specifications 'vere provided and approved insofar
as ~Jxhibit A is concerned, and w·e }Lave no knowledge of
any such plans and specificationsr
rrhc intervenor in July and August of 1952 had no
vested right in the proporty. A right which is not vested
but lies in action and which requires resort to a court of
equity to invest plaintiff with the right claimed is'~ executory·~'' H ardu;ick. v~ Atnerican Ca.·n Co., 113 Tenn~ ti57,
88 S. W. 797; lla.tch v. Standard Oil Co., 100 U. S. 124,
25 T~. Ed. 554; Lo·l;al v . Wolf~ 179 Ala. 505, 60 So. 298;
OklaJtotna .lfoline Plow Co. v. Sntith, 41 Okla. 498~ 139 P.
285; Idaho Implement Co. v. La.·mbach., 16 Ida. 497, 101

P.

951~

The ,,..alentines bolUld themselYes to build a ser,-icc
station .SOine tlillC ill the future after April 10, 1~1)2+ rrhe
payment of rental did not commence until 1\.ugust 10~
1952, or~' as soon thereafter as a service station is erected
and accepted'' by the Jessee .
'.: ~\ li

t•.\.ecntory contrart 1s nne in \\·hif•h a party
hinds him~(\lf to do~ (Jl~ not to do a particular thing,
\,-ll~·rPH~ an exp~·uted rout rnct i~ one iu \vhieh the
o hject of an agreement i ~ performPd and everything that "·ns to he (l0ne, is don£:~~'
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J ~ ;\m. Jur.; Contract.~, para. 10.

rfhe order of OCC-upancy was made prior to the com~
pletion of the station and the intervenor, not having taken
possession of the property, could not force completion of
the station.

PoiNT

V.

THERE ARE NO DAMAGES RECOVERABLE BY
THE INTERVENOR, FOR THE REASON THAT AT THE
Tlrv!E OF ENTERING INTO THE ALLEGED LEASE
UPON WHICH THEY SUE, THE INTERVENOR KNEW
THi-\ T THE PROPERTY WAS ABOUT TO BE CONDEMNED AND THAT ANY INTEREST IT TOOK
WAS A DEFEASIBLE INTEREST SUBJECT TO
DEFEASANCE.
DefeaRanee, as defined in Restatement, Property,
para. 15·7 -0: 16b, is as follo,vs:
"1~he 'vord
ment generall~y

'defPaRancc' is used in this state~
to de~erihe not only the ending of
an interest in aceorllanee \Vi tll i 1s i ermr-;, as for

example, by the expiration of ;~ stipulated duration or in accordance vrith the terms of a special
limitation, but also the cutting short or an interest,
:18 for example, tl1c c.ntting of an interest by a
pOv{er of termination h y an executory 1i mi ta tion~"
If the intervenor had any property right at all, after
its possession of the property, it '\vas at most a tenancy
at will or at least a tenancy at sufferance. If it 'vas the
lat.t.er, it is not. a tenancy at all; it is merely an arlverE;e
possession.. H . L. Rrcsf Co. v. IJru-ry (D(~) 6:! App. D . C.
329~ 68 Fed. ~d 167; H clh:r v., J cnfzr:h, 309 \J o . 440, 260
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S.,V. 979. If it is a tenancy at will, it is not transferrable
(hence not salable) for the reason that tho purchaser has
no right v..""hich he ho Ids against the landlord. rrhom pson,
Real property, para. 1029.
PoiNT

VI4

AT THE DATE OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS,
THE INTERVENOR HAD NO OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE AND COULD NOT EVALUATE THE LEASEHOLD.
The evaluation of any interest in the property owner
as against the condemnor is as of the date of the service
of summons in the condemnation action4 (This not to the
eontrary under the decisions of t hP former la '\\'".)

It was during the period from August 12,. 1952, until
December of 1955, and only during that period, and under
order of thu court, that th~ intervenor produced any
business vthatsoever. So it becomes evident that there
was no possible evaluation of the lea.sehold interest at the
time the State actually took possession of the property.
Chicago, etc4 v. Cath-olic Bish.op,.lO Xr E. 372. Mr. Kiepe
testified at the hearing (Tr4, March 11, 1959, p. 10) that
at the time he inspected the property, there ,\~as no Yalue
to the leasehold. As to a later date, Mr. Kiepe testified,
hased upon assumptions and potential values, that the
leasehold had some value. He particularly qualified his
remarks 'vith respect to the assumptions gubmitted tn him.
There is no substantial basis for the assumption~ or the
hypothetical questions submitted to Mr. Kiepe at the
time he testified on ~larch 11~ 1959. See Orgel on \Tuluation~ \Tol. 1, para. 162, et seq~
14
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PotxT VII~

THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT TO ASSESS DAMAGES TO
THE INTERVENOR.
The only competent testimony submitted to the court
which \Ve consider non-speculative nor remote [s that of
l\Ir. Kiepe, who testified in substance that there v.,Tas no
value to the lease for a buyer knowing that the State
Road Commission was about to develop a. road through
the premiRes of defendants Valentine and that even as
late as 1955, when the Western States Refining Company vacated the premises, there would still be no value
to the remainder of the lease~ (Tr. Trans. )farch 11~ 1959,.
p. 10-29)

The testimony of I\Ir. \'l agsta:ff and his assistants,
as submitted to the court on the hearing of February 4,
1959 7 was purely speculative and remote~ and we "\\'on~
der how speculative one can get in arriving at a proper
measure of damages. The other testimony \Vhich ,~{as
adduced in 1UilG was not sub~taTltiated hy any records,
nor was there any competent testimony to indicate the
value of the leasehold. (Tr. Trans.~ Nov. 7, 1956, P~ 35-46)
Elements of this remote, speculative and conjectural
damage are tarred \\'ith that ]abel and are not subjeet.
to compensation as being a too distant extension or damage~ based on consideration of the highest and best value
of the land.

The court in the case of I-luJniltou v. Pitls7rurgh B~ d~
L. ET~ R. Co . , 190 Pa. 31, -J-~ ..:\t. 369, aptly stated it~ posit ion on business profit.~ as evidence of YH lt H~ as f ollo\Y ~ :
15
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most i.ha t ran 1H.~ said in i t.s favor is,
that sueh profits might possillly he made, hut that
they \VOuld be made d<..~p011ds on so n1any contin.
gennie~ that a verdict \vhieh purports to be the
trutb cannot be based upon them. ~ ~ ~ Assume
that today his fuel would (·ost no more for a large
additional output, ho\v can he undertake to fix for
years the cost of labor and n1alerials for operating
his plant ? lio \\. c~;~ Tl he duterrnine that in the futu rc
rival manufactureT~s 'vill not have advantages in
some olller location superior to his and undersell
hin1 on t}HJ market Y H ov,r can he determine thai
l1is present supply of natural gas ~ill continue
and that it vrill not give out? ~ • ~ T·he testimony
on this subject waR vrildly speculative. • ~ ~"
(,; rl,hc

\"Pl'Y

In the instant ease, we add one further speculation.
Hovr can the intervenor determine ·~vhether gas "VI-Tars and
und ereu tting \\rill not give 1\'"ay to the more conservati v(~
1
metl1od~ of dolng busines8 1 See Orgel, \ ol. 1, p. 658-662.
Ordinary profits are not to be considered. City of J_Jos
A·ngelPs v. Deaco·n (1932}, 7 P~ 2d 378; Korf v. Fltming
(1948L 3~ ~T. ,V. 2d 85; Ja.J1u·:.~· Pvuttry Co~ Y .. J..!eb-raska
(! 1~fy ( 1939)'

284 1<.

"'!· 273 .

CO~TCL(TSI():\

\Ve snbmit that the cause should be remanded to the
(·ourt below '\\ith orders to dismiss the same.
Respectfully submitted,

\V.i\L'l,ER
_i\

L~

BlJDGE
tt o rn0 :.- G eneral

\VALL~\C~1 1:

B. KEL·L·r

Assistant ~ \ ttorney General

A ttor u ep~c..· for
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